

Cultural Challenges in the New Multiethnic Japan

— Perspectives of Japanese Residents —

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INTRODUCTION

The number of guestworkers has significantly increased in Japan. Part of this increase occurred in the 1980s when the shortage of unskilled labor in Japan became so severe that many small and medium size companies felt threatened (Tsuda, 1999; Sellek, 1997). As a result, Japan began to witness an expansion of the number of foreign workers since many Asian immigrants from neighboring countries chose Japan as a major destination and many of them worked illegally in construction, manufacturing, and other service industries (Mori, 1997; Tsuda, 1999). These workers came partly because Japan was experiencing a shortage of labor and strong currency valuations (Douglass & Roberts, 2000). In 2003, the number of registered foreign residents reached its peak and totaled 1,915,030. The number equals 1.5 percent of Japan's total population of 127.6 million including people from 186 countries (Ministry of Justice, 2003) making a huge leap in the last 30 years⁽¹⁾.

Although recent data demonstrate the significant increase of immigrants coming to Japan, the number of foreign residents in Japan is still very low compared to the United States⁽²⁾. However, many scholars present future projections that point to an increasing number of immigrants in Japan. According to several significant studies, more immigrants will be coming to Japan (*Shanghai Star*, 2003; Curtin, 2003; *Japan Times*, 2004). This is an important consideration because serving immigrants may no longer be a choice, but a necessity. Some authors use demographic analysis and United Nations population models in their research to predict Japan's demographic change (*Shanghai Star*, 2003; The Japan Institution for Labour Policy and Training, 2004; Xinhua, 2003). Curtin (2003) used the United Nations' population model in his article and said "If Japan wishes to keep up its 1995 working population (15 to 64 years) level of 87.2 million people, it would require an average net increase of 609,000 immigrants per year. This would equal a total net increase of 33.5 million immigrants into Japan from 2005 to 2050" (Curtin, 2003). In addition to Curtin's projections,

one Japanese research group mentioned that in order for Japan to maintain its economy, it will either lose its population due to a low birthrate or accept immigrant workers due to the dropping number in the labor force (Yamawaki, Kondou, & Kashiwazaki, 2000). Based on the current situation in Japan and the United Nations population model, it is reasonable to predict that the number of immigrants will increase. Therefore, this micro level study is designed to provide some insights about diversity and community integration in Japanese society.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN JAPAN

Colonial Period: Koreans

Today, the majority of permanent foreign residents are Koreans who make up 91.5 percent of permanent foreign residents (Douglass & Roberts, 2000). Japan colonized Korea in 1910. Around 1917, Koreans began to immigrate to Japan due to the labor shortage caused by the economic boom during the First World War. The number of recruited workers and forced laborers increased quickly (Yamawaki, 2000; Douglass & Roberts, 2000). During this colonial period, from 1900s to 1945, Japanese policy toward Korea sought to eradicate Korean culture and assimilate Koreans into Japanese culture. For instance, in 1938, the Korean school curriculum was forced to be the same as the Japanese school curriculum and Koreans were forced to use Japanese names in 1940. During this period, between 1939 and 1945, about 810,000 to 940,000 Koreans worked in mining, construction, and other manual labor on the Japanese archipelago. A large number of these Korean workers were farmers, poor, illiterate, and non-Japanese speaking (Lie, 2001).

By 1938, about 800,000 Koreans resided in Japan, a substantial increase from the 30,000 living in Japan during the 1920s. By the end of Second World War, the number of Korean residents increased dramatically to 2,100,000. These people were treated as legal Japanese citizens under the colonial system (Machimura, 2000). After Japan's defeat and the liberation of Korea, many workers returned to Korea, but more than 500,000 people chose to stay in Japan⁽³⁾. These people are now called *Zainichi Kankokujin* or Koreans who stay in Japan. Regardless of their length of stay in Japan, they still register as "foreigner." About 80 percent of them were born and raised in Japan, but they have not yet been granted Japanese citizenship (Tsuda, 1998).

Changes in the Japanese Economy: Newcomers

In the 1950s and 1960s, Japan experienced rapid industrialization and modernization of the economy, but successfully managed without importing labor from other countries because of a massive rural labor pool and incorporation of labor-saving technologies in large companies

(Yamanaka, 1993). In this period, a large number of young Japanese who had just graduated from junior high school in rural areas was sent to big cities. The economy developed and was sustained due to such labor sources.

Until the 1960s, Japan remained a net international exporter of low-wage workers. In the 1970s, emigration and immigration trends reversed so that more foreign laborers were entering Japan than were leaving Japan. In the 1980s, Japan started to experience a labor shortage. Guestworkers fell into low-wage jobs that were usually described as “3 Ks” (*kitanai, kiken, kitsui* – dirty, dangerous, and difficult) in order to fill the gap (Sugimoto, 2003; Kashiwazaki, 2002; Maher, 1998).

In the late 1980s, the labor shortage was apparent in industrial towns around the Tokyo metropolitan area. This period is referred to as the “bubble economy” in which the Japanese market became more internationalized and the economic upturn created a labor shortage, especially in the construction and manufacturing industries (Maher, 1998; Sellek, 1997). Many small manufacturing firms or factories had to rely on older Japanese employees due to the shortage of laborers. Under such conditions, young Asian migrant workers promptly took their positions, since most young Japanese were not willing to work 3K jobs (Lie, 2001; Stanley & Irving, 2000). In the late 1980s, one survey showed that an overwhelming majority, 77 percent, of Japanese manufacturing companies indicated their inability to hire Japanese (Lie, 2001). Therefore, many of these companies were forced to employ foreign workers since it was the only way to maintain their labor force (Tsuda, 1999).

The rising flow of foreign workers was driven by the large wage differences between their home countries and Japan and the high Japanese GNP per capita in comparison to the developing countries (Yamanaka, 1993; Lie, 2001). In the 1980s, Japanese GNP per capita was 30 times that of the Philippines and 125 times that of Bangladesh. This wage differential meant that in Japan, a Bengali worker could earn the same amount of money in a day that would take months to earn back in his home (Lie, 2001). In 2001, the GDP per capita of China was US\$927; the Philippines was US\$925; and Indonesia was US\$676. Japan's GDP per capita (US\$32,851) was 35 to 48 times more than these countries (The Japan Institution for Labour Policy and Training, 2004).

Immigration Reform: Nikkei Brazilians and Nikkei Peruvians

In 1989, the revision of immigration laws had a profound impact on migration to Japan and opened the doors to large-scale immigration of workers of Japanese descent, called *nikkei*, from Latin America (Douglass & Roberts, 2000). This immigration reform law allowed second and third generation of *nikkei* a renewable stay of up to three years with unlimited

access to labor markets. The opening of immigration to *nikkei* quickly resulted in more than 200,000 immigrants from Latin America coming to Japan (Douglass & Roberts, 2000). The population of registered Nikkei Brazilian residents in Tokyo significantly increased from 1,000 in 1987, to 71,000 in 1997. Similarly, the number of people from Peru increased from 200 in 1987, to 22,000 in 1997 (Machimura, 2000). These people came to Japan as sojourners to find well-paying jobs (Yamanaka, 2000). These *nikkei* people are second and third generation descendants who first entered Brazil between 1908 and 1924. About 35,000 Japanese immigrated to Brazil to work as contract farm laborers in large coffee plantations in the Southern part of the country, primarily in the state of São Paulo (Yamanaka, 2000). In 1925, the Japanese government established a national policy to promote emigration to Brazil, which resulted in 120,000 immigrants moving there. Cultivation of rice, coffee, cotton, and other crops brought relative stability for the Japanese immigrants, but their plans to go back to Japan were delayed because of slow returns on agricultural investment. These immigrants were isolated from cities and lived in their own ethnic settlements where the Japanese language and community ethos were maintained (Yamanaka, 2000). These *nikkei* now have returned to Japan after the revision of immigration law to pursue high wage work positions. In 1991, there were 145,614 immigrants from Peru and Brazil. This number increased to 328,349 in 2003 (Ministry of Justice, 1993b; Ministry of Justice, 2003).

Other Culturally Diverse People

In addition to the major historical flow of immigrants, it is important to approach the presence of non-Japanese from a different perspective⁽⁴⁾ as Okano and Tsuchiya (1999) suggest. They noted that there are four groups of newcomers who recently arrived in Japan. The first group is the grandchildren of Japanese orphans who recently returned from China. These orphans were abandoned when China was colonized by Japan. Their Japanese parents returned to Japan at the end of the war, so those children were raised as Chinese. In the 1980s, some of them decided to return to Japan with their children and grandchildren in order to start a new life.

The second group consists of second and third generation descendants of the Japanese who immigrated to South America early 1900s. The revised Immigration Act in 1989 granted them the privilege of working in Japan, regardless of the skills they had. As a result, the number of Brazilians and Peruvians working in Japan increased dramatically, from 2,865 in 1987 to 145,614 in 1991. In 2003, the number of Nikkei Latino was 328,349 (Ministry of Justice, 2003).

The third group in Japan is illegal workers who mainly come from Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines⁽⁵⁾, Malaysia, Iran, and China. Many of them have no access to social welfare and medical insurance, despite their physically dangerous employment. The Japanese

government does not issue work visas for most people who are in low skill jobs or service jobs. Because many migrants work illegally, they have a vulnerable status in Japan and are denied legal and human rights (Lie, 2001). In 2003, there were 219,418 illegal undocumented workers in Japan (Ministry of Justice, 2004).

The fourth group is refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. In 1990, there were about 8,000 such refugees. Some people took Japanese citizenship, but over half of the refugees who arrived in Japan have subsequently left for third countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Australia (Okano & Tsuchiya, 1999). The Japanese government gives refugees from these Southeast Asian countries both temporary and permanent residence. In December 2000, 13,768 refugees had reached Japan; 6,816 went on to a third country, and 10,797 became permanent residents (Foreign Press Center, 2002).

In addition to the above four groups, there is another significant returnee group. They normally stay overseas for three to five years working as agents who flourish in the Japanese international economy (White, 1988). White (1988) states the Japanese families who have been sent overseas by their companies face severe “paradoxical culture warp” once they return to Japan (p. 1) since teachers and classmates do not know how to treat a returnee child and residents in the community are doubtful whether a returnee housewife can fit in to be a member of the group. Returnees are seen as “troublesome agents of discord or as helpless victims” (White, 1988, p. 104). The whole notion of membership or *uchi* and *soto* is discussed in *The Japanese Overseas*. The author stated that the strictness of boundaries is laid down deeply into a long cultural tradition of *uchi-soto* (inside-outside) distinctions, and once people leave Japan, their membership is suspended for the period they are gone. When they re-enter Japan, they *normally* display foreign ways that raise “questions of identity that can be silenced only by strict conformity and virtual denial of the foreign experience” (p. 106). In 2002, there were 10,778 returnees in the educational system in Japan (Ministry of Education, 2004).

RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

This research was conducted by both qualitative and quantitative mixed methods⁽⁶⁾. The total number of quantitative surveys is seventy-five and the number of qualitative in-depth interviews is ten that reveals reactions of Japanese residents in terms of recent phenomenon of growing numbers of foreign residents, affinity, and community integration.

Japanese Respondents

Profiles. I collected 75 surveys from Japanese, 70.7 percent male and 29.3 female (Table 1). The average age of the respondents was 41 years old (Table 2).

Table 1. *Gender*

Gender	Frequency (%)
Female	22 (29.3%)
Male	53 (70.7%)
<i>N</i>	75 (100.0%)

Table 2. *Age*

Age range	Frequency (%)
18-19	1 (1.3%)
20-29	13 (17.3%)
30-39	26 (34.7%)
40-49	13 (17.3%)
50-59	13 (17.3%)
60-69	8 (10.7%)
>70	1 (1.3%)
Mean	41.5 years old
<i>N</i>	75 (100.0%)

Perception. Table 3 shows the Japanese respondents' perception toward *gai kokujin* and Nikkei Brazilians. The table is designed to show comparison. According to the table, four respondents (5.3%) selected "very negative" toward *gai kokujin* while 1 respondent (1.3%) answered "very negative" to *nikkeijin*.

Twenty-two (29.3%) respondents showed negative feelings toward *gai kokujin* (5.3% "very negative" and 24% "negative") while 15 respondents (20%) showed negative feeling toward *nikkeijin* (1.3% "very negative" and 18.7% "negative").

Fifty-three (70.7%) respondents showed positive feelings toward *nikkeijin* (56% "positive" and 14.7% "very positive") while 58 (77.3%) respondents showed positive feelings toward *nikkeijin* (61.3% "positive" and 16% "very positive"). In short, the perception toward *nikkeijin* is positive compared to *gai kokujin*.

Table 3. *Perception: Very Negative to Very Positive*

Categories	Feeling to <i>gai kokujin</i> Frequency (%)	Feeling to <i>nikkeijin</i> Frequency (%)
Very negative	4 (5.3%)	1 (1.3%)
Negative	18 (24.0%)	14 (18.7%)
Positive	42 (56.0%)	46 (61.3%)
Very positive	11 (14.7%)	12 (16.0%)
<i>N</i>	75 (100.0%)	73 (97.3%)
<i>Missing</i>	0 (0.0%)	2 (2.7%)

Table 4. *Affinity: Do you have more affinity to nikkeijin compared to other gai kokujin in Japan?*

	Frequency (%)
No	25 (33.3%)
Yes	50 (66.7%)
<i>N</i>	75 (100.0%)

Table 4 shows affinity to *nikkeijin* compared to other *gaikokujin*. Two thirds of the respondents expressed their affinity to *nikkeijin* (66.7% said they have affinity to *nikkeijin* and 33.3% said they do not have affinity to *nikkeijin*).

In short, a high percentage of Japanese has positive feelings toward *gaikokujin* and *nikkeijin*. The people who show negative feeling toward *gaikokujin* are 29.3 percent and toward *nikkeijin* is 20 percent.

Semantic differential. The respondents were asked to select from a scale that which best describes *gaikokujin* and Nikkei Brazilians. As table 5 shows, 18.6 percent of Japanese respondents said *gaikokujin* are trustworthy (13.3% “trustworthy” and 5.3% “very trustworthy”) while 33.4 percent of respondents said *nikkeijin* are “trustworthy” (26.7% “trustworthy” and 6.7% “very trustworthy”). Similarly, 21.4 percent of respondents said *gaikokujin* are untrustworthy (6.7% “very untrustworthy” and 14.7% “untrustworthy”). On the other hand, 17.3 percent of respondents replied that Nikkei Brazilians are untrustworthy (1.3% “very untrustworthy” and 16% “untrustworthy”). In short, the Japanese people think Nikkei Brazilians are more trustworthy than *gaikokujin*.

As table 6 shows, most respondents believe that *gaikokujin* and Nikkei Brazilians are both valuable to Japan. 62.7 percents said *gaikokujin* are valuable to Japan (36% “valuable” and 26.7% “very valuable”) and 60 percent said Nikkei Brazilians are valuable to Japan (38.7% “valuable” and 21.3% “very valuable”).

Table 5. *Semantic Differentiation: Very Untrustworthy to Very Trustworthy*

Categories	In general, <i>gaikokujin</i> are Frequency (%)	In general, Nikkei Brazilians are Frequency (%)
Very untrustworthy	5 (6.7%)	1 (1.3%)
Untrustworthy	11 (14.7%)	12 (16.0%)
Neutral	45 (60.0%)	37 (49.3%)
Trustworthy	10 (13.3%)	20 (26.7%)
Very trustworthy	4 (5.3%)	5 (6.7%)
<i>N</i>	75 (100.0%)	75 (100.0%)

Table 6. *Semantic Differentiation: Very Much a Burden to Very Valuable*

Categories	In general, <i>gaikokujin</i> are Frequency (%)	In general, Nikkei Brazilians are Frequency (%)
Very much a burden for Japan	1 (1.3%)	1 (1.3%)
A burden for Japan	4 (5.3%)	5 (6.7%)
Neutral	23 (30.7%)	24 (32.0%)
Valuable for Japan	27 (36.0%)	29 (38.7%)
Very valuable for Japan	20 (26.7%)	16 (21.3%)
<i>N</i>	75 (100.0%)	75 (100.0%)

There are few respondents who think *gaikokujin* and Nikkei Brazilians are a burden to Japan; 6.6 percent said *gaikokujin* are a burden to Japan (1.3% “very much a burden” and 5.3% “a burden”) while 8 percent of Japanese said Nikkei Brazilians are a burden (1.3% “very much a burden” and 6.7% “a burden”).

Relationship. Table 7 is a negative or affirmative question about friends. About 22 percent of respondents have Nikkei Brazilian friends while most respondents (76%) do not have any Nikkei Brazilian friends. Among the respondents who do not have Nikkei Brazilian friends, 52 percent of respondents showed their indifference to making Nikkei Brazilian friends while 21.3 percent showed their interest in making Nikkei Brazilian friends (Table 8).

In terms of neighborhood, most respondents feel open to having Nikkei Brazilians in the community (Table 9). However, 24 percent of respondents replied that they do not want them to live in their community. In short, a fairly high percentage of Japanese show their interest in having *nikkeijin* in their community, but many Japanese do not show interest in being their friends.

The most frequent comment made by those who responded yes to the question “Do you like them to stay in your neighborhood” was that having Nikkei Brazilians in their communities increased globalization. For example, one person stated “It would be a good opportunity to bring global perspectives and break through the closed Japanese society.” Another person said

Table 7. *Friends: Do You Have Close Nikkei Brazilian Friends?*

	Frequency (%)
No	57 (76.0%)
Yes	17 (22.7%)
<i>N</i>	74 (98.7%)
<i>Missing</i>	1 (1.3%)

Table 8. *Friends: If No in Table 7, Do You Want to Have Nikkei Brazilian friends?*

	Frequency (%)
No	39 (52.0%)
Yes	16 (21.3%)
<i>N</i>	55 (73.3%)
<i>Missing</i>	20 (26.7%)

Table 9. *Neighborhood: Do You Like Them to Stay in Your Neighborhood?*

	Frequency (%)
No	18 (24.0%)
Yes	53 (70.7%)
<i>N</i>	71 (94.7%)
<i>Missing</i>	4 (5.3%)

“It is a good opportunity to learn about different cultures and hear different opinions.” The second most frequent comment was about an affinity towards *nikkeijin*. For instance, one person stated “I would like to get along with the offspring whose ancestors had a hard time in Brazil.” Several other Japanese mentioned “They have Japanese blood” and “I feel close to them.”

The most frequent comment of people who responded no to the above question was that having *gaiokujin* increases social crime. For instance, one person stated “I have an image that *gaiokujin* equals social crimes.” Another person said “From what I have learned from mass media and seen on the street, I am afraid of *gaiokujin*.” Several Japanese who responded no to the question showed indifference towards *gaiokujin*.

After the survey questionnaires, I conducted in-depth interviews. This mixed methods approach highlights several important patterns in the responses from Japanese residents. During the interviews, I realized that many Japanese people emphasized how they welcome diversity. For instance, one of the interviewees, Mr. S said “The tendency is good because Japan has been isolated from other countries for a long period of time so we need to have more non-Japanese for globalization. It is a good tendency to have many non-Japanese.” He continued and presented a different perspective. “I might not say it openly, but many people think having *gaiokujin* workers is good for reducing labor costs. But I shouldn’t really say it.” He mentioned how *gaiokujin* workers would help the Japanese economy and enhance its globalization. As I spoke with them in greater depth; however, a second pattern emerged. In fact, although they welcome diversity in principle, they are not accepting of diversity of behaviors that might change or threaten their lives. What they defined as diversity was “similar types of non-Japanese,” rather than a diversity of behaviors or value-systems. Mr. S replied “It depends on which nationality. Based on Japanese mass media broadcasts, I feel scared of Muslim people (people from the Middle East). I have a prejudice against them because of terrorism. But I feel okay if people are North Americans or Caucasian. I know prejudice is bad, but it is natural to feel this way because of news these days. I am interested in Christianity so I feel more close to Americans. I am also studying English so I would welcome Americans if they lived near our home.” For instance, Ms. T stated, “I do not mind having *gaiokujin* residents in Japan as long as they do not commit crimes. I also do not mind if *gaiokujin* live next to my home as long as they have good work and a decent life.” Another resident, Mr. M, also mentioned conditions for *gaiokujin*. “*Gaiokujin* should follow Japanese culture and customs from the beginning.” Otherwise, he continued, Japanese will be prejudiced and have negative images of *gaiokujin*. Ms. T also said same thing: “Since Japan is such a closed society, it is best that they accept Japanese culture and behave like Japanese. Otherwise, we think they are arrogant, because this is Japan.” We talked about a famous proverb, “When in Rome, do as the Romans do.”

Generally, the interviewers talked about the importance of personal level relationships such as making close non-Japanese friends in an effort to decrease prejudice toward *gaiokujin*. Also, they mentioned some conditions of *gaiokujin* living in Japan. They said that since Japan has been an extremely closed society, Japanese people need to adjust to non-Japanese people. The more non-Japanese in Japan, the less prejudiced Japanese will be. Social integration is really a process to become acquainted with non-Japanese, creating an environment where non-Japanese can keep their identities and cultures, and improve affinity toward Japanese people and society.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION

It is natural that globalization has implications for diversity of value systems and different behavioral patterns, but Japanese people seem not to be ready to seek “real diversity.” Therefore, they want *gaiokujin* to behave like “Japanese.” Another implication of this study is the emergence of globalization in Japanese society. While I was in the Kanagawa prefecture, I was astonished to encounter the diversity of people, supermarkets, and restaurants where signs are written in multiple languages. It was the first time I felt “globalization” in Japanese society. Japanese people used to experience globalization only at international restaurants or international festivals, but now they can encounter globalization on a daily basis. Lie (2001) mentions that when Japanese people encounter the fact of ethnic diversity, “many Japanese either ignore or deny it” (p. 81). However, the tendency is rapidly changing.

It is significant that even as Japan becomes more open to immigration, the contradiction between these two patterns persists. These contradictory patterns point to a major barrier against integration that I came upon during the interviews: strong behavioral expectations related to assimilation. Expectations help communication; however, strong expectations block further integration, hinder appreciation of differences, and encourage assimilation. The strong expectation of the Japanese side that “non-Japanese should behave like Japanese as long as they live in Japan” may be one of the causes blocking foreign residents from integrating into Japanese society.

The discussion of *kaikoku* (keep the door open to non-Japanese) and *sakoku* (keep the door closed to non-Japanese) is now less relevant. Douglass and Roberts (2000), who relate demographic change and the need for immigrants, observe the following: “With the country’s impending population decline, a rapidly aging society, a low-wage service sector and income disparities, it seems that the global age of migration is to become a permanent, if uncomfortable, feature of Japanese life” (p. i). This phenomenon will continue and influence the daily lives of Japanese people.

[Notes]

- (1) In 1975, the total number of foreign residents in Japan was 751,842, which was 0.6 percent of Japan's total population. In 1991, right after Japan's economic miracle and the revision of immigration law, the number quickly increased to 1,218,891, which was 0.98 percent of Japan's total population. In 1998, the population of registered foreign residents increased to 1,512,116, which equaled 1.20 percent of Japan's total population: the population in that year was double compared to 1975. See Ministry of Justice, 1993a.
- (2) In the United States, according to the Census Bureau reports, 56 million are immigrants and they make up 20 percent of the U.S. population. See U.S. Department of State, 2005. In Switzerland, approximately 19 percent, Germany 9 percent, and England 4 percent of the population were immigrants in 1997. See Ministry of Justice, 2004.
- (3) Kim (2000) states two reasons why these Koreans did not return home. First, he points out the political and economic corruption of the destination country, Korea. Thus, they were discouraged to return home and build new lives. Second, he states that the amount of baggage and currency to bring back to the home country was strictly controlled by the Japanese government. Thus, it was impossible for most Koreans to start new lives in Korea so that they had to give up going home, and chose to stay in Japan (Kim, 2000).
- (4) In this section, I only focused on the main historical flow of foreigners in Japan, but did not mention a small number of groups, such as grandchildren of Japanese orphans from China, illegal foreign workers, and refugees. Therefore, it is helpful to grasp other culturally diverse people to understand Japan's diversity.
- (5) When Japan was poor, Japanese girls from poor farming families were forced to go to cities in Southeast Asia to earn money. These girls were called *karayukisan*, which literally means "people going to China" (Honda, 1993, pp. 115-116). Today, we see a reverse flow of girls from Southeast Asia to Japan to work in the entertainment business sector (p. 115).
- (6) Yin (2003) states "Case studies are the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed"; when the researcher has little control over events; and when a contemporary real-life phenomenon is focused upon (Yin, 2003, p. 1). The sampling process I used here is called purposive sampling, which Merriam (1998) describes as "based on the assumption that the investigator wants to discover, understand, and gain insight and therefore must select a sample from which the most can be learned" (p. 61). Interviews were conducted by means of face-to-face guided interviews. There are two observational strategies that are employed in the research: "observer as participant" and "complete observer". Through this observational strategy, life styles, behaviors of Nikkei Brazilians, and public interactions of Nikkei Brazilians and Japanese were observed. Atsugi City and Aikawa Town in Kanagawa prefecture were selected because of my personal network to these communities and because they did not appear to be extreme cases in terms of population size, but seemed to be typical communities which had started to have growing numbers of guestworkers.

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